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FOREWORD
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the
contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on
the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic
opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical
blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made
a number of telling points against the Bush administration’s conduct
of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing
Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness,
a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic
groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that ﬂowed from
the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in
failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had
no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons,
including the danger that the imperatives of “force protection” may
sacriﬁce the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for
skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and
expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The dramatic contrast between expectations and reality in the Iraq
war has sparked a wide-ranging debate over “what went wrong.”
According to many critics, civilian planners made a series of critical
mistakes that have turned what might have been a successful war and
occupation into a ﬁasco. The most common critique takes roughly
the following form:
•

Though the war plan to topple Saddam was brilliant, planning
for the peace was woefully insufﬁcient.

•

The United States did not have a sufﬁcient number of troops
to restore order in Iraq after the U.S. invasion and also failed
to develop a plan to stop the widespread looting that occurred
in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad.

•

The administration erred in disbanding the Iraq army, which
might have played a valuable role in restoring security to the
country.

•

The United States erred further in its harsh decrees proscribing
members of the Ba’ath party from participation in Iraq’s
public life—a decision, like that which disbanded the army,
needlessly antagonizing the Sunnis and pushing many of
them into the insurgency.

•

The Bush administration needlessly antagonized the
international community—including both the United Nations
and our European allies—and made it much more difﬁcult
to obtain help for the occupation and reconstruction of the
country.

•

The Bush administration was too slow in making funds
available for reconstruction and created a labyrinth
bureaucracy for the awarding of contracts.

These revisions, the authors argue, are themselves in need of
revising. Though the critics have made a number of telling points
against the conduct of the war and the occupation, the basic
problems faced by the United States ﬂowed from the enterprise
v

itself, and not primarily from mistakes in execution along the way.
The most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—
“endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning economy,
and a decimated society”—were virtually inevitable consequences
that ﬂowed from the breakage of the Iraqi state.
The critique stressing the insufﬁcient number of forces employed
in the invasion, though valid abstractly, exaggerates the number and
type of forces actually available for the conduct of the war. Once
account is taken of the exigencies of a multi-year campaign, the
stresses on active and reserve forces created by maintaining troops
in the 108,000 to 150,000 range, and the unrealism of assuming
signiﬁcant allied contributions (given the opposition of public opinion
to the war in most allied states), it would have been impossible to
generate force levels in the 300,000 to 400,000 range called for by
many critics.
Plans for “Phase 4” operations, which were given little attention
before the war, failed to anticipate the most serious problems facing
U.S. forces after the fall of Baghdad—persistent anarchy and the
emergence of a raging insurgency. This was a mistake, as critics
point out, but it is very doubtful that U.S. forces could have gotten
a handle on the problem even had these contingencies received the
planning they deserved.
A war plan keyed to the problem of postwar disorder would
have inevitably confronted a substantial gap in time between the
disintegration of the state and the arrival of forces of sufﬁcient
size to establish order. A different plan in all probability could
have prevented the worst consequences of the looting, such as the
destruction of irreplaceable cultural sites and important government
ministries, but the larger consequence of widespread anarchy
probably was unavoidable.
It was clearly a mistake to misperceive the size and motives of
the insurgency, but it is not so clear that there was a solution to
the problem once its scale had been fully appreciated. Most armed
opposition was created by the invasion itself and would likely have
arisen even had U.S. forces employed milder tactics or employed a
different political strategy.
It is very doubtful that the reconstitution of the Iraqi army could
have stemmed the immense disorder of occupied Iraq. At best, there
vi

are unanswered questions regarding who might have ofﬁcered
the force, the functions it would have performed, and its political
orientation and reliability. Though U.S. forces did not give the training
of Iraqi forces the attention it deserved in the ﬁrst year of occupation,
the limited results were due, also, to the artiﬁcial character of the
national forces the United States sought to build.
Criticisms of the political course followed by the United
States—the creation and administration of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, persecution of the Baathists, distrust of the Shia (through
cancellation of local elections)—all have merit. At the same time,
the more fundamental truth is that the United States had thrust
itself into the middle of a bitterly divided society, and there was no
apparent way to split the difference between groups whose aims
were irreconcilable.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was in basic respects a test of the
theory that civilians must intervene in the military planning process
and force their perspectives down the chain of command. Though
the record of Iraq war planning does nothing to advance the case
for civilian activism, critics also have neglected the larger lesson that
there are certain limits to what military power can accomplish. For
certain purposes, like the creation of a liberal democratic society
that will be a model for others, military power is a blunt instrument,
destined by its very nature to give rise to unintended and unwelcome
consequences. Rather than “do it better next time,” a better lesson is
“don’t do it at all.”
Other lessons are that the military services must digest again the
lesson that “war is an instrument of policy.” The profound neglect
given to re-establishing order in the military’s prewar planning and
the facile assumption that operations critical to the overall success
of the campaign were “somebody else’s business” reﬂect a shallow
view of warfare. Military planners should consider the evidence that
occupation duties were carried out in a fashion—with the imperatives
of “force protection” overriding concern for Iraqi civilian casualties—
that risked sacriﬁcing the broader strategic mission of U.S. forces.
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REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING:
WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE IRAQ WAR
It is already a cliché that much has gone wrong in the American
war against Iraq.1 Two years after the invasion by U.S. and coalition
forces, the contrast between what American ofﬁcials expected would
occur, and what in fact did occur, is stark. A telling symbol of that
contrast was the deployment of 150,000 U.S. troops in the country
on the eve of the January 30, 2005, elections. Before the war, by
contrast, Pentagon planners had assumed that U.S. forces might be
reduced to as little as 35,000 by the fall of 2003. Before the war, U.S.
military ofﬁcials did not take seriously the prospect that a raging
insurgency might face the U.S. occupiers and had assumed that
widespread revulsion among Iraqis against Saddam Hussein’s rule
would translate quickly and effectively into support for a temporary
American occupation. In actuality, Iraqi opinion—especially
outside the Kurdish community—proved far more hostile to the
U.S. occupiers than had been foreseen, such that overwhelming
majorities in the Sunni community and a substantial portion of the
majority Shia community deemed the United States an “occupying”
rather than a “liberating” power. Before the war, administration
ofﬁcials minimized the ﬁnancial costs of the enterprise, emphasizing
that Iraq’s oil resources would enable the Iraqis to pay the lion’s
share of the costs of reconstruction. In truth, the costs of the Iraq
occupation have proven to be far greater than had been predicted,
with special congressional appropriations amounting to $192 billion
by May 2005, and much more on the way.2 Even with such large
expenditures, precious little reconstruction had actually taken place
in Iraq a year-and-a-half into the occupation. Only $1-2 billion of the
$18 billion authorized for reconstruction by Congress in late 2003 had
been expended a year later, and Iraqis had yet to see much tangible
improvement in employment or quality of life after a year-and-a-half
of occupation. A study by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, DC, argued that, in every area necessary for
a successful reconstruction of Iraq, there had been not only lack of
progress but an actual deterioration of conditions on the ground.3
The best case, according to a Chatham House study in the fall of
1

2004, was that a new Iraqi government, buttressed by U.S. military
power and given a boost by elections in early 2005, would hang on in
the face of a continuing insurgency. The worst case was that Iraq was
headed toward a breakup of the country and protracted civil war.4
The dramatic contrast between the administration’s hopes and the
reality it confronted has sparked a wide-ranging debate over “what
went wrong.” According to a legion of critics, the planners of the Bush
administration made a series of critical mistakes that have turned
what might have been a successful war and occupation into a ﬁasco.
The most common critique takes roughly the following form: though
the war plan to topple Saddam was brilliant, planning for the peace
was woefully insufﬁcient.5 The United States did not have a sufﬁcient
number of troops to restore order in Iraq after the U.S. invasion and
also failed to develop a plan to stop the widespread looting that
occurred in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. Though
the U.S. State Department had conducted a comprehensive study
of the problems of occupying Iraq, its conclusions were ignored
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to the extent that the
Director of the State Department study on the future of Iraq, Thomas
Warrick, was excluded by the administration from joining Jay
Garner’s team.6 The administration erred, according to the critics, in
disbanding the Iraq army, which might have played a valuable role
in restoring security to the country, and it erred further in its harsh
decrees proscribing members of the Ba’ath party from participation
in Iraq’s public life—a decision, like that which disbanded the army,
needlessly antagonizing the Sunnis and pushing many of them into
the insurgency. The Bush administration also needlessly antagonized
the international community—including both the United Nations
(UN) and our European allies—and made it much more difﬁcult to
obtain help for the occupation and reconstruction of the country.
It was too slow in making funds available for reconstruction and
created a labyrinth bureaucracy for awarding contracts.
These views represent the opinions of left-leaning writers and
critics; many of them were featured prominently in John Kerry’s
presidential campaign in 2004. Right-leaning authors have joined
in some of this criticism—especially the argument that the United
States invaded with too few forces—but their emphasis often has
differed. Some argue, for instance, that the many U.S. troubles
2

stemmed from the fact that the war was conducted in too humane
a fashion, such that the enemy never really was defeated. Others
argue that the original Pentagon plan for the war called for a rapid
transfer of sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi government followed
by elections, and that that this plan, which would have stood a much
better chance of providing Iraqis with a sense of “ownership” over
their own society, was mistakenly shelved and the decision made
to install a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with a very slow
timetable for writing a constitution and holding elections.7
These criticisms do not exhaust the litany of errors the Bush
administration is said to have committed in the course of the Iraq
war, but they represent a broad swath of the criticism that had
developed as of late 2004. Underlying them is the conviction—
sometimes explicitly voiced, at other times merely implicit—that the
administration “squandered an unprecedented opportunity.”8 Had
things been done differently, it is often assumed, the United States
would have faced a far more pleasant prospect than it did 2 years
after the initial invasion. This criticism has arisen most often from
those who supported the invasion and were distressed by how badly
the occupation fared, but even critics of the war have often left, if
only by implication, the same impression. The problem with U.S.
policy in Iraq, in short, lay not in the end chosen but in the means
embraced, and had those means been different, the outcome would
be different as well.
These revisions, we shall be arguing, are themselves in need
of revising. Though the critics on both the left and the right have
made a number of telling points against the conduct of the war
and the occupation, it is not so clear that different choices on the
part of civilian or military ofﬁcials would have led to a signiﬁcantly
improved outcome. We can see the deleterious consequences
ﬂowing from certain of the administration’s decisions, but we can
only speculate about what consequences might have followed had
a different route been taken. Nevertheless, strong reasons exist for
believing that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American
occupiers—“endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning
economy, and a decimated society”9—were virtually inevitable
consequences that ﬂowed from the breakage of the Iraqi state. At
best, the critics have pointed to policies that, had they been adopted,
3

would have provided the necessary conditions for a successful war
and occupation. Whether they would have been sufﬁcient, however,
must be subject to grave doubt.
“Success,” of course, is subject to varying measurements, and it is
to be expected that the larger political assessment of the Iraq war will
continue to provoke deep divisions. Advocates of the war, whose
shaken optimism recovered with the November 2004 offensive
against Fallujah and the January 2005 elections, are likely to remain
advocates even if political and economic reconstruction remains
elusive. However bad it gets, the answer is ready that something
much worse lay in prospect had Saddam Hussein been left in
power. Opponents of the war, who insisted that containment and
deterrence were workable policies that need not have been displaced
by preventive war, will continue to deplore the war as causing great
and unnecessary dangers, but now must deal with the new reality
created by the American occupation—above all, the disastrous
strategic implications of an Iraq that dissolves into warring statelets
or remains an economic wasteland.
The larger argument that rages, and that will continue to rage, over
the justiﬁcation of the Iraq war is not our concern in this monograph.
Here we want to focus on the decisions made in the initial year of
the intervention and ask whether they were those best calculated
to achieve the results the administration wished to achieve—the
creation of a secure, liberal, and democratic Iraq. The exercise is not
entirely an academic one. Like the long argument that arose over
the Vietnam War, the lessons drawn from the Iraq experience will
unavoidably exert a profound inﬂuence over force structures, war
strategies, and public attitudes for a long time.10
Obstacles to a Successful Reconstruction.
Three great problems have emerged since the fall of Saddam’s
statues in April 2003: criminal anarchy, a protracted insurgency,
and a society deeply divided on ethnic and sectarian lines. Each
of these has ramiﬁcations for the ability of the occupying power to
provide security. “If you don’t master security,” noted one observer,
everything else “gets washed away like sand castles on the beach.”11
It is, as it were, the sine qua non of economic reconstruction, political
4

rehabilitation, and the fostering of a new civil society.12 If we are to
think clearly about the “might have beens” of the Iraq war, these
three factors, and the bearing they have on the provision of security,
are clearly of crucial signiﬁcance. If the critical accounts of the
planning and implementation of the Iraq war are to be accepted, it
must be shown that a different course of action would have dealt in
a satisfactory fashion with these formidable obstacles.
The widespread looting that occurred after U.S. forces raided
Baghdad and toppled Saddam’s statues on April 9, 2003, symbolized
the problem of criminal lawlessness and anarchy that has pervaded
Iraq since the regime’s collapse. By the time it had run its course
(after which there was little left to loot), virtually no industrial plant,
government ministry, or cultural institution was left intact. Over the
course of the following months, a spasm of car-jackings, kidnappings,
and murders emerged that added to the sense of a society under
siege. Saddam, as one columnist put it, had not been replaced by
Bremer but by Hobbes—the state of nature in which life was “solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” This widespread criminal anarchy
dug a hole from which the occupiers have found it very difﬁcult to
emerge. It not only made the challenge of reconstruction immensely
more difﬁcult, but made freedom seem indistinguishable, in the
Iraqi mind, from anarchy. By demonstrating that coalition forces
could not control the basics of security, the persistence of anarchy
undoubtedly gave a signiﬁcant ﬁllip to the resistance.13
The second obstacle to a satisfactory reconstruction has been
the emergence of a protracted guerrilla and terrorist insurgency,
which American planners also failed to anticipate. “What we were
really hoping,” commented one U.S. commander, “was to just go
through, and everyone would wave ﬂags and stuff.”14 It is now
clear that the insurgency enjoys advantages on its own terrain that
are just as formidable as the precision-guided weaponry deployed
with devastating effect by the United States. Because U.S. forces can
destroy everything they can see, they had no difﬁculty in marching
into Baghdad and forcing the resistance underground. Once
underground, however, the resistance acquired a set of advantages
that have proved to be just as effective as America’s formidable
ﬁrepower. Iraq’s military forces had no answer to smart bombs, but
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the United States has no answer—at least no good answer—to car
bombs. Iraq’s military forces were powerless to resist America’s
overwhelming dominance in the air, but, by the same token, America
ﬁnds it very difﬁcult to guard against insurgents able to strike
unprotected targets. American losses are painful and unexpected,
but the key strategic vulnerability does not consist of the 1,706 dead
and 12,855 wounded American soldiers.15 It has consisted instead
of the insurgents’ capability to sow such conditions of fear and
insecurity as to make extremely difﬁcult the various tasks required
for the reconstruction of the Iraqi state and the rehabilitation of its
economy. The American invaders and the Iraqi resisters have both,
in their different ways, conﬁrmed the old adage that it is far easier to
destroy than to create. For the side for whom “not losing” is the key
imperative, that circumstance makes for a profound advantage; for
the side that must win, as the occupying power must, it is a profound
and perhaps fatal handicap.16
The third important obstacle to the success of the American effort
is that Iraq is a profoundly divided society. Ruled historically by
the Sunni minority who comprise approximately 20 percent of the
population, Iraq also contains a minority of Kurds in the northern
part of the country and a majority Shia population (estimates range
from 55 to 65 percent) whose base of power is in the south, but who
are to be found also in Baghdad and points north. The existence of
these historic divisions has made problematic any reconstruction of
the Iraq government. Any solution that gave power or signiﬁcant
advantage to one of these groups at the expense of another
immediately raised the prospect of civil violence. Over the course
of the past 2 years, signiﬁcant factions within each of these groups
have threatened noncooperation or violence if their vital interests
were not safeguarded. The Kurds, for example, threatened secession
from Iraq unless they gained control of Kirkuk, a city they consider
to be theirs but from which they were driven by Saddam Hussein’s
“Arabization” campaigns.17 Most Shia, by contrast, tolerated the
American occupation, but only on the condition that the United
States was seen to be moving rapidly toward democratic elections
that would give them power. The Sunnis, who have been the biggest
losers of the U.S. invasion and were the ethnic base of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, provided the largest number of ﬁghters for the
insurgency.
6

These are clearly formidable obstacles; any one, by itself, would
have posed fundamental problems for the occupying force. Together,
they have made for an extremely difﬁcult situation. Clearly, it has been
the parlous security situation that has made economic reconstruction
go so slowly. This program was undoubtedly misconceived in the
exclusive role given to American primary contractors (required by
Congress) for expenditures in Iraq, but misgivings over its character
have been greatly heightened by the bad security situation and
the need to divert funds from civilian infrastructure to protective
forces.18 So, too, projects for building civil society could barely get off
the ground when participants feared for their lives. The insurgency,
as one observer noted, “sucked the oxygen out of the liberal
experiment,” with large numbers of Iraqi liberals having “taken
refuge behind barbed-wire gates, ﬂed the country, gone broke, or
been murdered.”19
Given the vital importance of providing security for the
reconstruction of Iraq, and the fatal role that insecurity has played
in making progress in every other sector highly problematic, it is
remarkable that neither the problem of acute anarchy nor that of a
raging insurgency were anticipated by American war planners before
hostilities commenced. Though there was a plan for “Phase 4” (postcombat) operations that anticipated the potential for large numbers
of refugees and the possible destruction of Iraqi oil facilities, the
plan did not foresee what turned out to be the most serious dangers
confronting the occupation.20 In one sense, of course, these failures
amount to a kind of directed verdict against the civilian and military
war planners. It is only a kind of verbal legerdemain that allows
observers to say that the war plan was superb and the peace plan
was a bust. The United States has been at war in Iraq since March
2003; it cried “peace” when there was no peace; victory when there
was no victory.
The Numbers Game.
One persistent criticism is that the invasion was mounted with
altogether insufﬁcient U.S. forces. The Bush administration, writes
Larry Diamond, “was never willing to commit anything like the
forces necessary to ensure order in postwar Iraq.” Diamond believes
7

that “around 300,000 troops might have been enough to make Iraq
largely secure after the war,” but also insists that “different kinds of
troops, with different rules of engagement,” were needed, including
“vastly more military police and other troops trained for urban
patrols, crowd control, civil reconstruction, and peace maintenance
and enforcement.”21 Others have put the numbers needed much
higher. According to one study, the same ratio of peacekeepers to
population as in Kosovo would generate a force requirement of
480,000 troops for Iraq; if Bosnia were the model, 364,000 would be
required.22 James Fallows, in his incisive critique of American war
planning, notes that the original military plan (prepared in the 1990s
by then U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] commander Anthony
Zinni and later updated) called for an invasion force of 400,000. Over
time, in response to the persistent objections of Secretary Rumsfeld,
it was pared back so that only some 200,000 forces were in theater at
the time of the Iraq invasion. Of these, less than half were actually
in Iraq itself when Baghdad fell as a consequence of the “rolling
start” to the operation. One division, scheduled to invade Iraq from
Turkish territory, had been refused admittance by the Turks and was
in transit to Kuwaiti ports; most remaining forces were marshaling
in Kuwait.23
That additional U.S. forces would have been useful can scarcely
be denied. Iraq’s borders were left unguarded for a year, according to
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, and clearly more might have been done
on that score. Also, a large number of ammunition dumps across the
country were left unguarded for months, including critical facilities
like the al-Qaqaa one south of Baghdad. U.S. forces were clearly shorthanded in dealing with the anarchical conditions in Iraq. Even when
looters were arrested, there was no place to put them and no way to
process them, and they were simply released.24 The large number of
Iraqis swept up into the U.S.-managed prison system—approaching
some 40,000 in the ﬁrst year alone, of whom about 9/10ths were not
part of the insurgency—were processed by U.S. forces that were
“overworked, overwhelmed, and under-resourced.”25
But two large qualiﬁcations to the critique stressing insufﬁcient
U.S. forces committed to Iraq must be made. The ﬁrst is that the United
States did not actually have in possession the requisite numbers of
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the “different kinds of troops” that critics, not unreasonably, insist
ought to have been sent. Second, and more seriously, a much larger
force at the beginning would have substantially decreased the ability
of the United States to maintain higher force levels over the course
of the occupation. Indeed, experience from spring 2003 to fall 2004
indicates that ground forces were stretched extremely thin by the
pressures of maintaining a force in the 108,000-150,000 range, to
say nothing of the 300,000-500,000 that critics have called for, with
unsustainable reliance on National Guard and Reserve units and a
“broken” mobilization system. A large number of American troops
at the beginning would only have been possible if there had been
a rapid drawdown by fall 2003. Once the problem is seen as one
of maintaining a force over a protracted period (say, 3 to 5 years),
there is simply no way to generate those large numbers within
existing force constraints. It might be argued, of course, that had the
initial invasion force been 300,000-400,000 troops, the later problems
confronting the occupiers would have been substantially reduced,26
but this is unlikely. Even if considered probable, it would still have
been a big risk. Military planners were just as blind as civilians in the
Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to these factors. They, too,
assumed it would be a “quickie,” a glorious one-night-stand from
which an uncomplicated withdrawal would be possible. Very few to
none were thinking in terms of the protracted commitment that now
seems all but inevitable.27
One way of solving this problem was to obtain sizeable
contributions from allied nations. This was, in fact, part of the
Pentagon’s prewar plan. It called for four divisions (one from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], one from Great
Britain, one led by Polish forces, and one from the Arab Emirates) to
replace withdrawn U.S. forces. It was modeled, that is to say, on the
previous multilateral experience of the 1990s in which the Americans
“made the meal,” and NATO and UN forces “did the dishes.” As
it happened, however, only the British and Polish-led divisions
materialized. The failure to gain additional international support
was a criticism often directed against the Bush administration by
domestic critics. The absence of UN authorization is one part of this
indictment, but another part is that 90 percent of the casualties and

9

the cost of the war has fallen on American shoulders. John Kerry in
particular made this a central part of his campaign against Bush in
the 2004 presidential elections, but calls to increase the international
character of the foreign presence in Iraq have been part of the litany
of criticisms from the beginning. “We’ve got a real problem because
it’s an American face as the occupier,” argued Democratic senator
Bill Nelson of Florida. “The anger and frustration of Iraqis could
have been avoided had it been the world community occupying Iraq
and stabilizing it instead of us.”28
This critique, however, is more properly focused on the decision
to go to war in the ﬁrst place rather than on the failure to gain much
allied support in the aftermath. Public opinion in allied countries
that might provide support was unconvinced by the three rationales
the Bush administration offered for the Iraq war—that war was
necessary to enforce UN resolutions calling for Iraq’s disarmament;
that war, in any event, was justiﬁed to deprive Iraq of its weapons
of mass destruction (WMD); and that war, ﬁnally, was imperative to
free the Iraqi people from the grip of a cruel tyrant.29 Instead, solid
majorities in most allied countries found U.S. actions to partake
of some mixture of the illegal, immoral, and imprudent.30 Because
the nations that might have provided outside support were mostly
democracies, public opinion inevitably constrained their ability to
offer troops. Even sharp opponents, however, did not actively obstruct
U.S. actions. The UN Security Council in May 2003 recognized the
United States as the occupying power and subsequently the council
and the secretariat contributed constructively, under the mediation
of Lakhdar Brahimi, to the formation of the interim Iraqi government
and a plan for nationwide elections. (Recall that inﬂuential Shia
leader Ayatollah Ali Sistani refused to meet with Bremer, and they
never exchanged so much as a bow.)
The UN’s formal acceptance of the occupation, however, did not
have a transformative effect on Iraqi opinion, and it is doubtful that
even a larger UN presence would have done so. The tragic loss of
the UN mission under Sergio de Mello in August 2003 made it clear
that terrorists and insurgents would target any group cooperating
with the U.S. mission in the country. This, in turn, meant that the
call for additional foreign forces under a UN banner was made in
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circumstances in which there would be real danger. The traditional
model of UN peacekeeping assumes that there is a peace to be kept,
and that UN workers can go about their mission of state-building
without extreme peril. These were not the conditions of post-invasion
Iraq. The 30 UN ofﬁcials in Iraq who worked on the organization
of the January 2005 elections were themselves largely conﬁned to
the Green Zone, and the unions representing UN workers warned
Secretary General Koﬁ Annan against sending them to areas where
their lives would be imperiled.31
The situation with respect to UN workers also pertains to the
prospect of signiﬁcant forces from other countries. The Governing
Council appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
made it clear that it wanted no soldiers from states bordering Iraq, and
vetoed a Turkish offer to send forces. Though the Bush administration
did get a UN Security Council resolution passed calling on member
states to aid in the reconstruction effort, contributions from other
states were mostly symbolic and well below prewar expectations.32
Given the overwhelming unpopularity of the war in the countries
most often mentioned as likely providers of outside forces—France,
Germany, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—the odds that more
adroit diplomacy could have succeeded in eliciting this effort seem
not too great.
Once one dismisses the prospects of signiﬁcant allied contributions—which followed from the unilateral character of the war—and
once one takes into account the need to plan for a protracted instead
of a one-time deployment of U.S. soldiers, the numbers question
appears dramatically different. Critics stressing the need for much
larger U.S. forces have not taken these factors into account. There
were real constraints on the numbers available to prosecute the
war.
Avoiding Anarchy.
Of all the missteps of the U.S. invasion, surely the most important
was the failure to stop or deal seriously with the widespread looting
and anarchy that enveloped Iraq, and most especially Baghdad,
in the days and weeks following the collapse of the Iraqi regime.
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Despite attempts to downplay the scale of the disaster by Secretary
Rumsfeld—freedom, he said, is “untidy”—the episode clearly
had extremely prejudicial effects on the prospects for a successful
occupation. That it would have been desirable to prevent this is very
nearly self-evident, but it is not clear whether it would have been
possible, even had the will been present and had the contingency
received the planning it deserved.
The reasons for the lack of preparedness in dealing with budding
anarchy and lawlessness are complex. Some evidence indeed suggests
that American ofﬁcials in the ﬁrst few days made no attempt to stop
the looting because they believed that the mob would direct its
anger at the symbols of the old regime and take revenge on the same
people that U.S. forces were themselves pursuing. Commented one
Iraqi political scientist educated at Princeton:
I believe the United States has committed an act of irresponsibility with
few parallels in history, with the looting of the National Museum, the
National Library, and so many of the ministries. People are saying that
the United States wanted this—that it allowed all this to happen because
it wanted the symbolism of ordinary Iraqis attacking every last token of
Saddam Hussein’s power.33

This is an exaggeration, but one that nevertheless contains a degree of
truth. The United States did not want the destruction of the National
Library and other cultural treasures, but it did want the symbolism
of ordinary Iraqis striking the Ba’athists. It just got much more than
it bargained for, and by the time it realized that what was happening
was fundamentally prejudicial to American interests in ensuring a
successful reconstruction, much of the damage had been done.34
The failure to deal with the looters had further causes. Warnings
from outside observers that anarchy would be a real and formidable
danger after the regime fell were not reﬂected in the orders given
to American units participating in the fall of Baghdad. The units of
the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) that took the city had no
orders for “Phase 4” operations and were forced to improvise on the
spot.35 Though the administration was warned previous to the war
that certain cultural institutions like the National Museum would
be endangered, the scale of the looting came as a great surprise
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to American ofﬁcials and to many Iraqis themselves, who were
shocked at the criminality that “freedom” unleashed.36 The toppling
of Saddam’s statues did not signal the end of Iraqi resistance, which
moved underground but continued to attack U.S. forces, and this
made it difﬁcult to transition to “peace and stability operations.” Over
and above these considerations was the belief that the peacekeeping
and stability tasks needed after the invasion were “someone else’s
mission,” not in keeping with Army’s warrior ethos.37
On the basis of these considerations, it is not difﬁcult to establish a
certain culpability on the part of U.S. forces in failing to contend with
the wholesale criminality and anarchy unleashed in Iraq. Nor can
this culpability be assigned simply to Secretary Rumsfeld and OSD.
Had the need for peacekeeping and law-enforcement capabilities
been behind the military’s preference for a larger invasion force,38 it
would have been reﬂected in the orders issued to the units that took
Baghdad, and there is no evidence that it was. What is misleading
about this interpretation is not the contention that CENTCOM ought
to have had a well-developed plan to deal with the looting, but the
assumption that it would have successfully mastered the problem
had it done so. This seems implausible. The criticism too readily
assumes that if problems are foreseen, there must in principle be a
solution to them. In all probability, however, a war plan keyed to the
problem of postwar disorder itself would have inevitably confronted
a substantial gap in time between the disintegration of the state and
the arrival of forces of sufﬁcient size to establish order, creating a
window of opportunity for looting that even a far-sighted plan could
not have closed. There is, moreover, substantial evidence that some
of the destruction was carried out by Iraqi intelligence agents and
could not have been guarded against, even had a determined effort
been made to do so.39 That the deliberate fostering of anarchy was
part of Saddam’s plan is also suggested by his release of some 100,000
criminals from Iraqi prisons several months before the invasion. Nor
was the anarchy conﬁned to Baghdad: looters arose from Mosul in
the north to Basra in the south and attacked an astonishing array of
targets across the country. A different plan could in all probability
have prevented the worst consequences of the looting, such as the
destruction of irreplaceable cultural sites and important government
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ministries, but it is difﬁcult to see how the larger consequence of
widespread anarchy, with all its implications for the success of the
American mission, could have been avoided. In large measure, this
consequence ﬂowed directly from the breakage of the Iraqi state.
Seen in broadest perspective, the breaking of the state in effect
destroyed Iraq’s immune system, making it vulnerable to a host of
ailments. Among these were criminal anarchy, the ease with which
foreign terrorists set up shop on Iraqi territory, widespread access
to arms, and a protracted insurgency. These consequences followed
from the act of war itself. They may have been mitigated by a
fundamentally different war plan, but they were likely to ensue even
if military plans had been informed by greater foresight and better
calculated to meet the dangers presented.
The Emergence of the Insurgency.
Reﬂecting on the emergence of a protracted insurgency, some
American military ofﬁcials and outside observers have concluded
that the United States was “too gracious” in its victory.40 President
Bush himself has spoken of a “catastrophic success,” by which he
meant to say that the Ba’athist regime had not really been defeated
during the phase of “major combat operations.” Sometimes this is
attributed to the inability to secure Turkish approval for launching
part of the U.S. attack from the north, from which it might have swept
through the Sunni Triangle region northwest of Baghdad and dealt
summarily with Ba’athist resisters. Whatever the case, there is little
question that the phase of major combat operations did not really
defeat the regime. Before the war, the U.S. military had expected
a formal surrender from units that would remain intact; instead,
Iraqi military units simply dissolved. Many soldiers just went home,
relieved that their service was at an end. Many others, it is apparent,
faded underground with the intention of continuing resistance.
Because those Iraqi forces willing to continue the ﬁght against
the United States were not defeated, it is often assumed that U.S.
forces might have followed a strategy that could have defeated
them. Like the strategy for dealing with anarchy, however, this, too,
is implausible. The Iraqi insurgents were not somehow obliged to
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present themselves in such a fashion as to be destroyed by precisionguided U.S. ﬁrepower. Indeed, one could argue that Saddam
Hussein played far more into the hands of the United States than was
advisable. In attempting a futile defense of Baghdad, he moved many
units into positions that were easily detectable by U.S. reconnaissance
and just as easily destroyed. His logical strategy from the beginning
was never to confront the U.S. military with massed forces, for in
such a ﬁght his troops were certain to be annihilated, but to save
them for the coming resistance.41 This, too, casts an interesting light
on “one of the most brilliant invasion successes in modern military
history,”42 for what the attackers aimed at—the dissolution of formal
resistance by Iraqi main force units—was the very thing it was in the
interest of the defender to accept. What the attackers did not think
of—the emergence of a guerrilla insurgency that would seek to make
reconstruction impossible—was, by contrast, the very thing that it
was most likely the defender would adopt.43
It is clear, in any event, that the insurgents have proved themselves
far more cunning and determined than initial estimates predicted.
The insurgency also has enjoyed a number of advantages stemming
from its superior knowledge of the terrain—a “home-ﬁeld advantage”
that is far more signiﬁcant in guerrilla war than in competitive
sports. In the ﬁrst place, the insurgency enjoyed widespread access
to arms and explosives. Given the ubiquity of such materials in Iraq,
it was probably impossible to reduce seriously the insurgents’ access
to them, even if a determined effort had been made to guard the
arms depots. Second, the capacity of the insurgents to strike from
unexpected directions inevitably made U.S. forces suspicious of any
approaching Iraqi. It has sometimes been argued that the isolation
of the occupying forces, whether in the U.S.-controlled Green Zone
in Baghdad or in armed patrols throughout the country, worked
strongly against gaining the trust of the population, but this was a
consequence forced on the occupiers by the insurgency. It is not clear
that anything could have been done about it, save at the risk of much
greater casualties for U.S. forces or administrators. Perhaps the key
advantage enjoyed by the insurgents was the capability of putting
U.S. forces in situations where the military response would further
antagonize the population and make any contact with them a source
of profound danger.
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The vulnerabilities that events have disclosed have included
the assassination of Iraqis working with U.S. forces in any capacity,
whether as translators, police, or soldiers, together with the threats
made against their families; attacks on oil facilities and other vital
infrastructure projects; strikes against the country’s transportation
arteries, making safe travel and logistical resupply extremely
problematic; the incessant attacks on patrolling U.S. forces; and the
kidnapping or killing of workers for nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) and commercial enterprises needed to rebuild Iraq’s
infrastructure.
Guerrillas classically are able to place occupying forces in
situations where they are “damned if they do and damned if
they don’t.” U.S. forces made determined efforts to root out the
insurgency, but these measures had the effect of increasing hostility
toward them in the broader population. Insurgents setting off
roadside bombs sometimes attacked U.S. forces responding to the
disaster, so U.S. forces frequently adopted the tactic of spraying ﬁre
rather indiscriminately once they were attacked—an expedient that
did not endear them to the local population.44 So, too, one of the
most alarming and depressing features of even the most egregious
terrorist attacks against civilian targets has been locals on the scene
screaming their hatred at the United States and holding U.S. forces
responsible.
It seems apparent that the insurgency could not have enjoyed the
success it has without support from the local population. American
ofﬁcials repeatedly characterized the insurgents as die-hard Ba’athists
or foreign terrorists; it is now understood that there are multiple
groups with varying agendas.45 U.S. ofﬁcials also minimized the
overall number of insurgents throughout the ﬁrst year after the fall of
Baghdad, usually placing the size of the insurgency at from 2,000 to
5,000 men. By fall 2004, unofﬁcial estimates from American military
ofﬁcers put the number at 20,000; a British general in the south put
it at 50,000; one U.S. intelligence analyst placed it, conservatively,
at 100,000 among Sunnis alone.46 With opinion polls in spring 2004
showing some 50 percent of Iraqis expressing the belief that attacks
on occupying forces were morally justiﬁed in some instances, the
number of sympathizers was certainly in the millions. Whatever the
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true number of insurgents, there seems little doubt that U.S. forces fell
into the trap of believing their own propaganda—failing in particular
to understand that most insurgents were probably motivated by a
nationalistic or religious revulsion against the invader or feelings of
revenge for a wrong done a kinsman rather than by attachment to
Saddam or al-Qaeda. It was clearly a mistake to misperceive the size
and motives of the insurgency, but it is not so clear that there was a
solution to the problem once its scale had been fully appreciated.
The most critical weakness of the U.S. forces was the absence of
good intelligence. One Army ofﬁcer on patrol in the Sunni triangle
noted that 90 percent of the information fed to his unit by Iraqi
informers turned out to be bogus. It was the imperative of gaining
better intelligence with respect to the sources and composition of the
resistance that led directly to the Abu Ghraib scandal, perhaps the
most dramatic instance of how a response to an insurgency may itself
compound an occupying force’s alienation from the population. But
this alienation also followed from the incessant raids that U.S. forces
conducted against suspected insurgents. The humiliation of seeing
one’s door broken down, the male inhabitants tied up, houses and
apartments ransacked for weapons, female undergarments scattered
about, was such that these tactics could only increase the numbers
of those willing to join the insurgency.47 The same is true of the vast
number of persons who passed into the U.S. prison system in Iraq.
At the same time, it is not clear that a far less aggressive approach
would have worked. It may well be true that various U.S. practices
have made the insurgency larger and more determined than it
would otherwise have been, but it is also highly probable that for a
substantial core of ﬁghters, the willingness to resist the occupation
through force arose in the ﬁrst instance from an alien invasion and
could not have been avoided through milder tactics.
The existence of these dilemmas, and the unhappy choices they
disclosed, were revealed in the confrontation between U.S. forces
and insurgents in Fallujah after four American contractors were
slain in April 2004. While public attention and criticism focused
on the inconsistency of ordering a large attack and then calling it
off after a massive outcry of Iraqi public opinion, the more basic
point is that this inconsistent conduct arose out of the extremely
disagreeable alternative that was presented. The same was true of
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the confrontation that ensued throughout southern Iraq after U.S.
forces closed the newspaper of Moqtada al Sadr and attempted to
arrest him, prompting widespread attacks from his followers from
Baghdad to Basra. The U.S. objective of killing or capturing Sadr
was abandoned in April, as it was in August, after the intervention
of Ayatollah Sistani. Given the inconsistent conduct of U.S. forces
in both instances, whereby they ultimately accepted what they had
previously declared unacceptable, it would be difﬁcult to defend
the overall record, one of vacillation and inconstancy.48 But the
record does underline the critical point: U.S. forces frequently found
themselves in situations where they, not unreasonably, felt compelled
to respond to provocation, but where the response imposed extreme
political costs. The Fallujah operation after the November 2004 U.S.
presidential election had the signal advantage of destroying many
car-bomb factories, but it also drove 300,000 Sunnis from their homes
and completely devastated the city.
The problems ﬂowing from bad intelligence seem virtually
endemic to the situation American forces confronted in Iraq. They
were strangers in a strange land. They lacked the linguistic and
cultural skills that might have defused misunderstandings, and,
even had these been possessed in greater numbers, they would,
as foreigners, have inevitably excited the suspicion and fear of the
population they were garrisoning. These difﬁculties, moreover,
would have existed even if American forces had been much larger
in size. The assumption that the United States would have won the
hearts and minds of the population had it maintained occupying
forces of 300,000 as opposed to 140,000 must seem dubious in the
extreme. Certain things could have done it better, like protecting
critical infrastructure, securing arms depots, guarding borders, or
processing prisoners, but the larger force would also have enabled
the United States to do more things that would have inﬂamed rather
than quelled the insurgency.
Abolishing the Iraqi Army and Proscribing the Ba’athists.
A persistent criticism of the Bush administration’s conduct of
the Iraq war has focused on the political maladroitness with which
it handled the Iraqis. The initial plan was for a rapid transfer of
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sovereignty to an indigenous Iraqi authority, probably headed by
Ahmed Chalabi. It also assumed that the Iraqi army, shorn of its
Ba’athist ofﬁcers, would remain in existence. In the confusion and
mayhem of post-liberation Iraq, however, the administration soon
decided to install Paul Bremer as the pro-consul of the country and to
shelve plans for a rapid transfer of sovereignty. One of the ﬁrst acts of
the CPA was to disband the Iraqi army, a measure complemented by
a far-reaching proscription of the Ba’athists. Both measures elicited a
great deal of criticism.
Unlike the various classes of Republican Guards or the irregular
fedeyeen forces, say the critics, the army was a national institution.
Several studies before the war—from the U.S. Army War College
and the Council on Foreign Relations, among others—argued that
an attempt should be made to negotiate with Iraqi units and use
them as a force for maintaining order.49 In any event, however, the
army simply disintegrated; bases were stripped bare by looters and
rendered effectively unusable. The situation that confronted the CPA
and Bremer was not that anticipated by any of the prewar studies. Like
any other body whose head has been decapitated, this conscripted
and ill-paid force (whose privates received the equivalent of $2 a
month) was unlikely to be reconstituted without major surgery.50
However much the reconstitution of the Iraqi army might appear
as a kind of deus ex machina to stem the immense disorder of occupied
Iraq, it is doubtful whether it could have done so. At best, we have a
series of unanswered questions regarding who might have ofﬁcered
the force, the functions it would have performed, and its political
orientation and reliability.51 Because it simply dissolved in the course
of major combat operations, it would have been useless to stem the
ﬁrst tide of anarchy and looting. Though often described as “highly
trained,” it was not trained for the policing and peacekeeping tasks
most urgently needed in the new Iraq. It is now regularly said that
the program to train Iraqi police, national guard, and army forces has
been beset by incompetence and mismanagement, and undoubtedly
the United States did not give this task the high-level attention it
deserved, farming it out in the ﬁrst instance to private contractors.52
These limited results, however, may simply reﬂect the profound
difﬁculties in seeking to train Iraqis to serve a foreign master. In
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effect, the CPA ruled out using the various militias, such as the
“Badr Brigades” of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), holding that the existence of these militias was a
threat to the integrity of the Iraqi state. However reasonable the
fear of fractionalization and civil war that lay behind this attitude,
it also underlined the artiﬁcial character of the national forces the
United States sought to build, and could not but foster the suspicion
among recruits that they were being asked to ﬁght for objectives not
their own. Until fall 2004, when a handful of Iraqi units—largely of
Kurdish and Shia composition—began participating in American
operations, the uniform record was the unreliability of all classes
of Iraqi forces—police, national guard, army. There is no reason for
thinking that the same difﬁculty would not have arisen with respect
to a reconstituted Iraqi army, and the inauspicious results from the
creation of the “Fallujah brigade” after the retreat of American forces
from the city in April 2004 provides telling evidence on this score.
It is, in any case, difﬁcult to think of a preceding case in which an
invader sought to rely upon the army it defeated for the maintenance
of order, and one should not exclude the possibility that U.S. forces
would have been providing arms and equipment to forces thoroughly
inﬁltrated by the insurgency.
These reﬂections are not inconsistent with the view that the
manner in which the disbanding of the army took place was a
mistake. Bremer initially disbanded the force without pay and later
felt compelled to rescind that decision so as to stiﬂe the anger it
caused. Certainly there was nothing to be gained from any measure
smacking of a gratuitous humiliation, but that does not mean that
a reconstituted army would have acted as a loyal servant of the
occupation. Given the U.S. experience with forces that have been
vetted and trained, this seems altogether unlikely.
A broader question may be raised with respect to the political
strategy that the CPA followed during its brief existence. If there
was a simple formula by which a coherent political strategy may
be expressed, it was to communicate to the Shia that they would,
as the majority group, quickly gain power through free elections; to
reassure the Sunni that, despite losing their historic dominance over
Iraq, they would not be subject to persecution; and to persuade the
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Kurds to cooperate in the maintenance of the Iraqi state and to rest
content with an autonomous status short of independence. In fact, the
American occupiers did not consistently pursue any such logic. The
proscription of the Ba’athists, many of whom had joined the party
as a condition of employment, was inconsistent with this strategy
and was partially reversed when the Allawi interim government
took power in summer 2004. The Ba’athist proscription, together
with the incessant raids in the Sunni triangle, virtually eliminated
the prospect of reconciling the Sunnis to the new order. At the same
time, the CPA took some measures that also seriously disaffected
the Shia. The most important (and least defensible) of these steps
was the cancellation of local elections, a measure taken because it
was thought that the best organized forces would be the Islamist
parties.53 The CPA also adopted a seven-step constitutional process
whereby free elections would only take place at the end of a 2-year
process drawing up a new constitution. Opposing a quick transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqis, Bremer told a congressional committee in
August 2003 that:
No appointed government, not even one as honest and dedicated as the
Iraqi Governing Council, can have the legitimacy necessary today to take
on the difﬁcult issues Iraqis face as they write their constitution and elect
a government. The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a written
constitution, ratiﬁed and followed by free, democratic elections.54

The CPA seemed to communicate, by its opposition to any immediate
elections, a distrust of the likely political leadership the Shia would
produce.
Since the Americans, under duress from Sistani, ultimately
reversed themselves on the question of transferring sovereignty
to a UN-appointed interim government and also speeded up the
electoral calendar they originally had envisioned, it seems difﬁcult
to defend the United States against the charge that it was doing in
fall 2004 what it ought to have been doing the year previously—
namely, playing a supporting role to an appointed but sovereign
Iraqi government that enjoyed international recognition and was
moving as rapidly as possible to nationwide elections. It is useful
to remember, however, that the original rationale of the CPA, in
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wishing to delay the transfer of sovereignty until elections were
held under a new constitution, was that an appointed government
would lack legitimacy. Having changed its mind in the interim, the
U.S. Government subsequently spoke in an entirely different vein,
but its original skepticism was true enough. The Allawi government
enjoyed greater legitimacy than the CPA, but that is not to say that it
really possessed legitimacy itself. On the contrary, it was profoundly
handicapped, as any such government would be, by the circumstance
that it could not stand without U.S. assistance but its dependence on
such assistance compromised its nationalist credentials in the eyes of
the Iraqi public.
In detail, these criticisms of the U.S. course—that it needlessly
persecuted the Ba’athists, that it sowed suspicion among the Shia, and
that it ﬂaunted rather than sought to minimize its leading role in the
occupation, even as against its own appointed Governing Council—
all have merit. At the same time, the more fundamental truth is that
the United States had thrust itself into the middle of a bitterly divided
society. To ﬁnd a successful political strategy in these circumstances
required the skill of an equilibrist and a substantial amount of sheer
good luck; even then, it may simply have been impossible. The
proscription of Ba’athists undoubtedly appeared as unnecessarily
punitive to the Sunni, but to the Shia and the Kurds, it was justice
delayed but not denied. That is why Ahmed Chalabi, angling for
a leading position among the Shia, was in favor of that step. Nor
should we exaggerate the signiﬁcance of the Ba’athist proscription in
fostering ill-will among the Sunni toward the U.S. occupation. There
was plenty of that created by the invasion itself, by the dislodgment
of Sunni elites that it implied, and by the measures pursued to track
down Ba’athists and to battle the insurgency. It was a perfectly
defensible piece of constitutional engineering that the Kurds were in
effect allotted a veto over any new constitution, but the Shia did not
accept the justice of this provision of the Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL) and pointed out, in terms almost Lincolnesque, that no
majority could consent to being ruled indeﬁnitely by a minority.55
Ultimately, the problem was that there was no apparent way to split
the difference between groups whose aims were, in the ﬁnal analysis,
irreconcilable.
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These considerations do not support the conclusion that the course
chosen by the United States was inevitable or that the insurgency had
to take the form that it did. Had the United States pursued a different
course—narrowing to a small group the number of Ba’athists who
would be proscribed; seeking to rejuvenate the old institutions of the
Iraqi state, especially the army; encouraging rather than canceling
local elections; moving speedily toward the appointment, with the
UN’s blessing, of an interim but sovereign government—a different
set of consequences from those actually experienced might well
have occurred. Though such a course was unlikely, given the overall
character of the war, the more endemic problem is that measures
friendly to the Sunni would have caused serious trouble within the
Shia communities whose cooperation was indispensable for the
success of the American effort. For an indeterminate but probably
substantial number of insurgents (certainly the foreign jihadists
and also many of the Salaﬁst and Wahabi Sunnis), for whom the
inﬁdel invasion was itself the most serious sin, it is doubtful that
their determination to resist by arms the U.S. occupation would have
been altered by these measures. At most such measures would have
made it more difﬁcult for this class of insurgents to ﬁnd refuge and
support in Sunni areas of the country, but some of these steps would
also have increased the likelihood of a Shia insurgency. Indeed, if
more conciliatory gestures toward the Sunni had been paired with
aggressive moves to disarm the Shia militias, the dangers of a Shia
insurgency would have been very considerably enhanced. Splitting
the difference between rival groups is a logical strategy in polities
accustomed to resolving conﬂicts through tolerance, negotiation,
compromise, and restraint, but where irreconcilable demands exist,
the result of this method may simply be to alienate both sides.56
The January 2005 elections did not overcome these various
schisms. The elections were important because they provided the
Shia with a sense of political ownership that dulls, for them, the sharp
edges of the American occupation. In addition, the new government,
even if hobbled by division and threats of breakdown, seems likely
to provide a boost to organizing Shia military power. But though
the election results will enable the Shia to ﬁght a civil war with
the Sunni more effectively (with the Kurds potentially in mortal
conﬂict with one or both of the others), the election does not ward
23

off the prospect of continuing and endemic violence. That requires a
political settlement whose formula still seems elusive. The elections
were not considered legitimate by the Sunni, who by and large did
not participate and who seem unlikely to submit to their effective
disenfranchisement. The confrontation in the North between Kurds,
who wish to control Kirkuk, and the Arabs and Turkmen, who wish
to see it under the control of the Iraqi state, has been delayed by the
Kurds’ desire not to offend the United States, but it remains likely
that ultimately the conﬂict, pitting irreconcilable claims against
one another, will be resolved by arms. Much as we must hope that
an Iraqi leader will emerge with the wisdom to reconcile these
contradictory aspirations, the historical record is not auspicious. In
ethnically heterogeneous countries, democratization has often been
followed by secession and civil war. In the depressing but probably
accurate formulation of James Kurth, “one could have an Iraq, but
without democracy. Alternatively, one could have democracy, but
without an Iraq. But one could not have both.”57
Lessons.
The principal purpose of this monograph has been to cast doubt
on the assumption that the United States squandered an historic
opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state through mind-numbing
incompetence. In reviewing the decisions of the Bush administration,
to be sure, one can certainly question a good number of them. But if in
detail the criticisms make considerable sense, the overall tenor of the
argument is very misleading. The basic problems the United States
has confronted ﬂowed from the enterprise itself and not primarily
from mistakes in execution along the way. “The war itself was the
original sin,” as one senior diplomat from the region observed.
“When you commit a sin as cardinal as that, you are bound to get
a lot of things wrong.” He illustrated the point, aptly, as follows:
“When you enter a one-way street in the wrong direction, no matter
which way you turn, you will be entering all the other streets in the
wrong way.”58
This conclusion should not be seen as absolving civilian and
military war planners from responsibility for the choices that were
made. It does argue, however, for a greater measure of realism
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regarding the constraints under which U.S. ofﬁcials operated, and
the sheer difﬁculty of the problems that were faced. Even if a larger
invading force had had an operational plan sensitive to the likelihood
that anarchy would follow rapidly from the decapitation of the Iraqi
state, it still would have been extremely difﬁcult to prevent most
of the large-scale looting and rampant criminality that descended
on the country. Even had American forces understood that they
were likely to face a growing insurgency after the war, it is doubtful
that they could have elaborated an effective strategy for defeating it
quickly, if at all. Given the extreme pressures that have been placed
on active and reserve forces in maintaining a force of 140,000 troops,
retrospective judgments that more forces should have been sent
at the beginning and throughout appear unrealistic, as do the oftheard calls for more international forces from countries that have
been keenly looking for a good excuse not to send them to Iraq since
the war began. A realistic appreciation of the manifold problems
that would arise from the invasion of the country actually pointed
to the conclusion that Iraq ought not to have been invaded and
“liberated” at all. As Fallows observes, the most prescient warnings
that emerged within the bureaucracy over the hazards entailed by
the Iraq invasion did come from those who opposed the enterprise.
In the nature of things, this made it very difﬁcult for the architects of
the invasion to take such warnings seriously.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was, in basic respects, a test of the
theory that civilians must intervene in the military planning process
and force their perspectives down the chain of command.59 Secretary
Rumsfeld did this in the ﬁrst instance by starting the bidding for the
forces committed to the invasion at 75,000 troops and intimating that
a smaller number would be entirely adequate. Events have shown
that the number was ludicrously small in relation to the tasks given
to U.S. forces, and that Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki was
right in seeing the need for much larger numbers. On this crucial
question, certainly, the record of Iraq war planning does nothing
to advance the case for civilian activism. Even if the indictment of
Secretary Rumsfeld is accepted, however, the case of the critics is
not thereby conﬁrmed. Taken at face value, that case amounts to the
proposition that there was a smart and a dumb way of going about
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the demolition and reconstruction of the Iraqi state, and that the
Bush administration, blinded by ideology, chose the latter course.
A more appropriate lesson is that there are certain intrinsic limits to
what military power can accomplish that both defenders and critics
of the administration’s course of action have ignored. “Policy must
know the instrument it is to employ,” says Clausewtiz in one of his
enduring formulations. For certain purposes, like the creation of a
liberal democratic society that will be a model for others, it seems
fair to conclude that military power is a blunt instrument, destined
by its very nature to give rise to unintended and unwelcome
consequences.60
It is notable, indeed, that the argument over “what went wrong”
has seldom, if at all, brought into question the tactics employed by
U.S. forces, but there was, in fact, a deep contradiction between
the democracy the United States said it was trying to build and the
methods it employed to battle the insurgency. Democracy, as it is
commonly understood, is about more than free and fair elections.
It requires “independent courts, equality before the law, and
constitutional limits on the powers of government. It establishes
independent institutions to control and punish corruption and abuse
of power.” No one in a democracy “may be arrested, imprisoned, or
exiled arbitrarily. No one may be denied freedom without a fair and
public hearing by an impartial court.”61 Such restraints, however,
had no bearing on the conduct of U.S. military forces, whose actions
were governed formally by the law of armed conﬂict rather than the
protection of individual rights typical of constitutional democracies.
The U.S. military relied on military intelligence, often defective,
rather than judicial warrants to conduct raids and pursue suspects. It
arrested and imprisoned many individuals without even a pretense
of fair and public hearings by impartial courts and often left family
members with no knowledge of the whereabouts of their kin or
the charges brought against them. There were few constitutional
restraints on U.S. actions, and none reachable by Iraqi authorities.
For all the effort that American ofﬁcials put into enshrining various
individual rights in the TAL, the United States was equally insistent
that the restraints on governmental power that the TAL incorporated
did not apply to the coalition forces that actually held the police and
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military power in the country. Even if the plea is accepted that such
measures were permitted by the laws of war and justiﬁed on grounds
of military necessity, the ﬂouting of such requirements by U.S. forces
could not but undercut the U.S. case for democracy. Such conduct
communicated to Iraqis that, while limitations on the power of the
state ought to be enshrined in the constitution, they might easily be
brushed aside by the appeal to national security.62
However Iraq ends, the lessons drawn from the experience are
likely to be very important for the American government. Probably
the most likely lesson is that agencies and departments of the U.S.
Government and military need to be recast to ﬁght another such
war successfully. Some suggest that the United States should beef
up its “nation-building” expertise, perhaps creating a cabinet level
department charged with “reconstruction and stabilization.” Others
argue that the army, having gotten out of the counterinsurgency
business after Vietnam, needs to devote far more emphasis to training
its forces to conduct those missions. A different conclusion would be
to devise a national security strategy in which there is no imperative
to ﬁght the kind of war that the United States has fought in Iraq.
Rather than “do it better next time,” the contrary lesson would be
on the order of “don’t do it at all.” There is, to be sure, a basic virtue
in what political scientist Samuel Huntington has called “strategic
pluralism.” Since threats are unpredictable, it stands to reason that
a wide variety of capabilities, including redundancies in various
service arms, is a virtue in national security strategy. Undoubtedly,
too, U.S. forces may be called upon again to participate in operations
to reconstruct “failed states,” and U.S. forces need to think about
how to do this intelligently. But consideration also needs to be given
to the counterargument that developing a wide range of capabilities
increases the likelihood that they will be used for unnecessary
enterprises.
Another lesson would be to insist on more realism in war planning
projections. We have seen that politically unrealistic assumptions
regarding the potential contribution of allied forces entered strongly
into the war planning process during the prelude to the Iraq war,
with the diplomacy of war preparation badly out of sync with the
assumptions of the military planners. Ironically, OSD’s decision to
pare the size of the invasion force, though justly criticized, had the
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unforeseen beneﬁt of leaving sufﬁcient reserves in the system to deal
with a protracted campaign. Had the United States invaded with
the 400,000 forces initially foreseen at the beginning of the military
planning process, U.S. forces would have been placed under severe
strain, and it is not evident how the challenge would have been met.
The severe pressures placed on Army Reserve and National Guard
forces by the Iraq campaign—including the odious expedient of the
“backdoor draft”—necessitate a rethinking of the entire system for
the recruitment and retention of ground forces.63
Finally, the military services—including but not limited to the
Army—must digest again the lesson that “war is an instrument of
policy.” The use of force must be guided by the imperative that it is
to serve a political aim. The profound neglect given to reestablishing
order in the military’s prewar planning and the facile assumption
that operations critical to the overall success of the campaign were
“somebody else’s business” reﬂect a shallow view of warfare. The
American war plan, far from being “the most brilliant in modern
American military history,” was, in crucial respects, not directed at
the main political object: ensuring a successful reconstruction. It did
not look toward “the day after” in a way that recognized the most
serious problems that would face the United States after the collapse
of the Iraqi regime.
This was not simply a failure of “intelligence” but one of
“strategic culture”—the tendency, that is, for war planners, both
civilian and military, to be “obsessed with stupendous deeds of ﬁre
and movement” rather than the political functions that war must
serve.64 That proclivity has many dimensions, from theories of
“shock and awe” in the Air Force and OSD to the aversion to policing
and peacekeeping functions in the Army. Though the aversion to
occupation duties did not and could not survive the encounter with
Iraqi realities, the duties were carried out in a fashion—with the
imperatives of “force protection” overriding concern for Iraqi civilian
casualties—that risked sacriﬁcing the broader strategic mission of
U.S. forces.65 Like other failures of the U.S. mission in Iraq, this, too,
has an air of inevitability about it. But civilian and military leaders
need to ask themselves whether such a bargain is good for the nation
and consistent with the professional ethic that soldiers are obligated
to obey.
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